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1. Introduction
Welfarist principles for social evaluation rank social alternatives using information about
individual well-being alone, ignoring non-welfare information. The most commonly used
approach to social-choice theory employs multiple proﬁles of welfare (utility) information
and uses a social-evaluation functional to assign a social ranking of the alternatives to
each utility proﬁle in the domain of the functional. Non-welfare information is implicitly
ﬁxed. Welfarism is a consequence of the axioms unlimited domain, Pareto indiﬀerence and
binary independence of irrelevant alternatives; see, for example, Blackorby, Bossert and
Donaldson [2002], Bossert and Weymark [2004], d’Aspremont and Gevers [1977], Guha
[1972], Hammond [1979], Sen [1977, 1979] and Weymark [1998]. For any social-evaluation
functional satisfying the three axioms, there exists a single ordering on the set of possible
utility vectors that can be used, in conjunction with the information in a proﬁle, to rank
the alternatives.
In the traditional social-choice framework, non-welfare information is assumed to
be ﬁxed and does not appear explicitly as a possible input of social evaluation. This is
unsatisfactory because, without having the option of varying the non-welfare information,
it is not possible to identify its inﬂuence. For example, suppose that whether or not an
agent is hardworking is to be taken into account in social evaluation and the individual
levels of welfare are not the only determinants of a social ranking. If there is a single
non-welfare-information proﬁle, it is impossible to say whether the preferential treatment
of an agent is due to the observation that he or she is hardworking or to some other
feature of the alternatives to be ranked. To isolate the inﬂuence of the agent’s attitude
towards work, it is necessary to examine the counterfactual: a proﬁle where the agent
is not hardworking. Thus, it is desirable to exclude non-welfare information explicitly
in a model! of soci al evaluation. One way of doing so is to introduce an expanded
version of an information proﬁle. In addition to a welfare component (U1, . . . , Un) that
consists of one utility function deﬁned on the set of alternatives for each member of society,
the information proﬁle contains a non-welfare component (K0, K1, . . . , Kn) where K0 is a
function that assigns social non-welfare information to the alternatives and, for i between
1 and n, Ki does the same for non-welfare information that is speciﬁc to individual i.
Thus, a proﬁle can be written as a pair (U,K) and K may matter in addition to U when
establishing a social ranking.
Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2004] allow for multiple proﬁles of non-welfare in-
formation. In that setting, the independence axiom is formulated in terms of both welfare
and non-welfare information. If, in any two proﬁles, welfare and non-welfare information
coincide on a pair of alternatives, binary independence requires the social orderings to rank
them in the same way. This weak version of binary independence, together with unlimited
domain and Pareto indiﬀerence, is shown to imply welfarism. In addition, this approach
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permits a compelling justiﬁcation of anonymous welfarism. The standard anonymity ax-
iom requires the social ordering to be unaﬀected by a permutation of utility functions
across individuals with non-welfare information (implicitly) unchanged. However, some
individual non-welfare information, such as being hardworking, may be thought to jus-
tify special consideration and this lessens the ethical attractiveness of the axiom. The
anonymity axiom employed in Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2004] requires the social
ordering to be unaﬀected if both utility functions and individual non-welfare-information
functions are permuted. Together with a restriction on the ranges of the individual non-
welfare-information functions (which is needed to e! nsure th at permuted proﬁles are
well-deﬁned) and the welfarism axioms, it implies that the ordering of utility vectors must
be anonymous: it ranks all permutations of a utility vector as equally good.
Although the multi-proﬁle approach has many attractive features, it can be criticized
on the grounds that it may not be suitable if the alternatives are assumed to be social
states of aﬀairs or histories of the world. In that case, it can be argued that both welfare
information and non-welfare information are part of the descriptions of the alternatives.
Consequently, only a single information proﬁle, determined by the set of alternatives,
is available. This view is strengthened by the requirement that utility information be
consistent with a comprehensive account of well-being such as that of Griﬃn [1986].
In such a setting, a multi-proﬁle approach requires some aspects of the descriptions of
alternatives to change when proﬁles change. Consequently, alternatives must be regarded
as labels for states of aﬀairs or histories. If, for example, the set of alternatives consists
of three elements, the multi-proﬁle approach requires the social-evaluation functional to
produce more than one ranking of the alternatives—one for each proﬁle in its domain. The
independence axiom ensures that these rankings are consistent.
This interpretation of the multi-proﬁle approach may suggest its rejection in favour
of a single-proﬁle approach. Although the single-proﬁle environment accommodates wel-
farism without any problems, there is a signiﬁcant diﬃculty with the standard anonymity
axiom because it requires multiple proﬁles (see, for example, Mongin [1994] for a discus-
sion).
A social ordering R of alternatives is single-proﬁle welfarist if and only if there exists
a social-evaluation ordering
∗
R deﬁned on the set of attainable utility vectors such that
any two alternatives are ranked according to R in the same way that their associated
utility vectors are ranked by
∗
R. The purpose of this paper is to formulate a sensible
anonymity axiom that can be used in the single-proﬁle setting. As in Blackorby, Bossert
and Donaldson [2004], non-welfare information is explicitly taken into consideration. In
this model, it is straightforward to verify that single-proﬁle welfarism is a consequence of
Pareto indiﬀerence only: no further assumptions are required and no assumptions about
the number of alternatives or information diversity are needed. The proof of the result is
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the same as in the case where non-welfare information is suppressed. This is no surprise
because, in the single-proﬁle case, whether the ﬁxed proﬁle of non-welfare information
appears explicitly is of no consequence for the single social ordering. However, once further
axioms that involve non-welfare information in a non-trivial way are imposed, this no longer
is the case. We illustrate this observation by analyzing the consequences of a single-proﬁle
version of the anonymity axiom.
In its standard multi-proﬁle formulation, anonymity requires that if a utility pro-
ﬁle and the individual portion of the corresponding non-welfare-information proﬁle are
replaced by a common permutation with social non-welfare information unchanged, the
resulting social ranking is unchanged as well. Clearly, this axiom makes no sense in a single-
proﬁle setting. Mongin [1994] proposes to extend the single-proﬁle domain by adding (at
least) all permutations of the proﬁle.
In contrast, we retain the single-proﬁle model and deﬁne a single-proﬁle version of
anonymity. It applies to any pair of alternatives x and y and requires the two to be
ranked as equally good whenever there exists a permutation ρ of the set of individuals
such that utilities and individual non-welfare information in y are obtained by applying
ρ to the corresponding values in x, provided that social non-welfare information is the
same in both alternatives. This axiom is easily defended because it is silent unless the
permutation is applied to both welfare and non-welfare information. The social-evaluation
ordering
∗
R is anonymous if and only if it declares any two utility vectors in the set of
attainable utility vectors to be equally good whenever one is a permutation of the other.
The anonymity axiom by itself, in conjunction with Pareto indiﬀerence, does not
imply that
∗
R is anonymous. This is the case because the axiom has no power unless alter-
natives exist in which both welfare and individual non-welfare information are permuted.
If a richness condition is employed, however, anonymous single-proﬁle welfarism can be
characterized. This characterization is the main result of the paper and it provides an
important step towards developing a satisfactory single-proﬁle theory of welfarist social
choice.
The next section introduces our notation and the axioms employed in the remainder
of the paper. Section 3 contains the results and proofs, and Section 4 concludes.
2. Basic deﬁnitions
The set of all positive integers is denoted by Z++ and the set of real numbers by R.
For n ∈ Z++, let Rn be the n-fold Cartesian product of R. We consider a society
N = {1, . . . , n} of n ∈ Z++ \ {1} individuals. The set of alternatives is X and we
assume that it is non-empty. For a vector u ∈ Rn and a bijection ρ:N → N , we deﬁne
uρ = (uρ(1), . . . , uρ(n)).
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There is a single (ﬁxed) utility proﬁle U = (U1, . . . , Un), where Ui:X → R is the
utility function of individual i ∈ N . Utility is an index of individual well-being. We write
U(x) = (U1(x), . . . , Un(x)) for all x ∈ X.
Non-welfare information is described by a single proﬁle K = (K0, K1, . . . , Kn), where
K0:X → K0 is a function that associates social non-welfare information with each alter-
native in X and, for all i ∈ N , Ki:X → Ki associates individual non-welfare information
for individual i with each alternative in X. The set K0 = ∅ is the set of possible values of
social non-welfare information and, for all i ∈ N , Ki = ∅ is the set of possible values for
individual i’s non-welfare information. We write K−0 = (K1, . . . , Kn) and, for all x ∈ X,
we deﬁne K(x) = (K0(x), K1(x), . . . , Kn(x)) and K−0(x) = (K1(x), . . . , Kn(x)).
In single-proﬁle social choice, a single social ordering R on X is to be established. I
and P are the symmetric and asymmetric factors of R. The ordering R is welfarist if and
only if there exists a social-evaluation ordering
∗
R on U(X) ⊆ Rn such that the ranking of
any two alternatives x and y according to R is obtained by the ranking of U(x) and U(y)
according to
∗
R. The symmetric and asymmetric factors of
∗
R are denoted by
∗
I and
∗
P . As
is shown in the following section, the Pareto-indiﬀerence axiom is necessary and suﬃcient
for single-proﬁle welfarism (see, for example, Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark [1990]
for a formulation without a non-welfare-information proﬁle). Pareto indiﬀerence requires
any two alternatives to be ranked as equally good if each individual is equally well oﬀ in
both.
Pareto Indiﬀerence: For all x, y ∈ X, if U(x) = U(y), then xIy.
As shown in Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2002], Pareto indiﬀerence is a conse-
quence of an axiom proposed by Goodin [1991] which we call minimal individual goodness.
It requires that if one alternative is socially better than another, it must be the case that
the former is better for at least one individual. Without this requirement, we run the risk
of recommending social changes that are empty gestures, beneﬁting no one and, perhaps,
harming some or all. To see that Pareto indiﬀerence is implied by minimal individual
goodness, suppose that everyone is equally well oﬀ in two alternatives x and y. Minimal
individual goodness implies that x is not better than y and that y is not better than x.
Because R is assumed to be complete, it follows that x and y are equally good.
In a multi-proﬁle setting, anonymity requires that if one proﬁle is obtained from an-
other by permuting the individual utility functions and non-welfare-information functions
and, moreover, social non-welfare information is unchanged, the same social ranking re-
sults for the two proﬁles. Clearly, this deﬁnition cannot be employed in a single-proﬁle
setting. We propose the following single-proﬁle anonymity condition instead.
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Single-Proﬁle Anonymity: For all x, y ∈ X and for all bijections ρ:N → N , if K0(y) =
K0(x) and (U(y), K−0(y)) = (U(x)ρ, K−0(x)ρ), then xIy.
Single-proﬁle anonymity requires the social ranking to be insensitive with respect to per-
mutations of all individual information attained in a given alternative. Note that the ax-
iom only applies if the permuted utility vector and the permuted non-welfare-information
vector are in the image of U and of K−0. The axiom is silent if this is not the case. Single-
proﬁle anonymity is easily defended because it allows non-welfare information to matter.
All that is ruled out is the claim that an individual’s identity justiﬁes special treatment,
no matter what non-welfare information obtains.
3. Welfarism and anonymity
We begin our discussion by stating the single-proﬁle welfarism theorem (see Blackorby,
Donaldson and Weymark [1990]) in our model where non-welfare information is explicitly
taken into consideration. Without further requirements (such as anonymity), the proof is
identical to that of the version without non-welfare information. We provide the proof for
completeness.
Theorem 1: R satisﬁes Pareto indiﬀerence if and only if there exists an ordering
∗
R on
U(X) such that, for all x, y ∈ X,
xRy ⇔ U(x) ∗RU(y). (1)
Proof. ‘If.’ Suppose
∗
R is an ordering such that (1) is satisﬁed. Pareto indiﬀerence follows
immediately from the reﬂexivity of
∗
R.
‘Only if.’ Suppose R satisﬁes Pareto indiﬀerence. Deﬁne the relation
∗
R on U(X) by
u
∗
Rv ⇔ there exist x, y ∈ X such that U(x) = u, U(y) = v and xRy (2)
for all u, v ∈ U(X). That ∗R is well-deﬁned follows from Pareto indiﬀerence. (1) follows
from the deﬁnition of
∗
R. It remains to show that
∗
R is an ordering.
For all u ∈ U(X), there exists x ∈ X such that U(x) = u. Because R is reﬂexive, we
have xRx and thus u
∗
Ru. Hence
∗
R is reﬂexive.
To show that
∗
R is complete, let u, v ∈ U(X) be such that u = v. By deﬁnition, there
exist x, y ∈ X such that U(x) = u and U(y) = v. Because u = v, it follows that x = y
which, by the completeness of R, implies xRy or yRx. Consequently, u
∗
Rv or v
∗
Ru.
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Finally, to prove that
∗
R is transitive, let u, v, q ∈ U(X) be such that u ∗Rv and v ∗Rq.
By deﬁnition, there exist x, y, z ∈ X such that U(x) = u, U(y) = v, U(z) = q, xRy and
yRz. By the transitivity of R, xRz and, consequently, u
∗
Rq.
An ordering
∗
R on U(X) is anonymous if and only if, for all u ∈ U(X) and for all
bijections ρ:N → N such that uρ ∈ U(X), u∗Iuρ. Adding single-proﬁle anonymity to
Pareto indiﬀerence does not guarantee that the ordering
∗
R is anonymous. For example,
suppose that X = {x, y} and N = {1, 2}. Suppose further that the individual utility
functions are such that U1(x) = U2(y) = 1 and U1(y) = U2(x) = 0. Finally, suppose that
K0 = { ‘freedom of speech’ }, K1 = K2 = { ‘hardworking,’ ‘not hardworking’ } and non-
welfare information is given by K0(x) = K0(y) = ‘freedom of speech,’ K1(x) = K1(y) =
‘hardworking’ and K2(x) = K2(y) = ‘not hardworking.’ The social ordering R such that
xPy trivially satisﬁes Pareto indiﬀerence and single-proﬁle anonymity but the associated
social-evaluation ordering
∗
R on U(X) = {(1, 0), (0, 1)} is not anonymous because, by
deﬁnition, (1, 0)
∗
P (0, 1).
In the presence of a richness condition, however, Pareto indiﬀerence and single-
proﬁle anonymity together are necessary and suﬃcient for the existence of an anonymous
social-evaluation ordering
∗
R. The richness property is needed to ensure that single-proﬁle
anonymity has any power at all (note that the axiom is vacuously satisﬁed in the above
example). It requires that if a utility vector u and a permutation uρ of u are in the image
of U , then there must exist alternatives x and y such that social non-welfare information is
the same in x and in y, and welfare and non-welfare information in y is given by applying
ρ to welfare and non-welfare information in x.
Richness: For all u ∈ U(X) and for all bijections ρ:N → N such that uρ ∈ U(X), there
exist x, y ∈ X such that U(x) = u, U(y) = uρ, K0(y) = K0(x) and K−0(y) = K−0(x)ρ.
Our main result characterizes anonymous welfarism in the single-proﬁle setting.
Theorem 2: Suppose richness is satisﬁed. R satisﬁes Pareto indiﬀerence and single-
proﬁle anonymity if and only if there exists an anonymous ordering
∗
R on U(X) such that,
for all x, y ∈ X, (1) is satisﬁed.
Proof. Suppose richness is satisﬁed (note that the property is required for the only-if part
of the proof only).
‘If.’ Suppose
∗
R is an anonymous ordering such that (1) is satisﬁed. Pareto indiﬀerence
follows from Theorem 1. To prove that single-proﬁle anonymity is satisﬁed, suppose that
two alternatives x, y ∈ X and a bijection ρ:N → N are such that K0(y) = K0(x) and
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(U(y), K−0(y)) = (U(x)ρ, K−0(x)ρ). Because U(y) = U(x)ρ and
∗
R is anonymous, it follows
that U(x)
∗
IU(y) and, by (1), xIy.
‘Only if.’ Suppose R satisﬁes Pareto indiﬀerence and single-proﬁle anonymity. The-
orem 1 establishes that the relation
∗
R on U(X) as deﬁned in (2) is an ordering such that
(1) is satisﬁed. It remains to show that
∗
R is anonymous. Suppose that u, uρ ∈ U(X) for a
bijection ρ:N → N . By the richness assumption, there exist x, y ∈ X such that U(x) = u,
U(y) = uρ, K0(y) = K0(x) and K−0(y) = K−0(x)ρ. By single-proﬁle anonymity, xIy
which, by (1), implies U(x)
∗
IU(y) and thus u
∗
Iuρ.
A slight modiﬁcation of the example discussed above illustrates the result. Infor-
mation for x and y is the same as in the example, and the richness axiom ensures that
there is an alternative z ∈ X with U1(z) = 0, U2(z) = 1, K0(z) = ‘freedom of speech,’
K1(z) = ‘not hardworking’ and K2(z) = ‘hardworking.’ The example is illustrated in Ta-
ble 1. In it, H means ‘hardworking’ and N means ‘not hardworking.’ Because both x and
z are in X with permuted welfare and non-welfare information, single-proﬁle anonymity
applies and requires xIz. Because utility information is the same in z and y, Pareto
indiﬀerence requires zIy and transitivity of R implies xIy. Welfarism implies (1, 0)
∗
I (0, 1).
Table 1
Person 1 Person 2
Utility Eﬀort Utility Eﬀort
Alternative x 1 H 0 N
Alternative y 0 H 1 N
Alternative z 0 N 1 H
4. Conclusion
Non-welfare information is explicitly modeled in Kelsey [1987], who provides a formulation
of Arrow’s [1951, 1963] theorem in this generalized framework, and in Blackorby, Bossert
and Donaldson [2004], where a generalization of multi-proﬁle welfarism is developed. The
present paper complements the analysis of Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2004] by
examining the single-proﬁle approach in the same general framework.
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We motivated the necessity for an analysis of the single-proﬁle approach by appealing
to some conceptual diﬃculties with multi-proﬁle social-choice theory that arise if alterna-
tives are assumed to be social states of aﬀairs or histories. The single-proﬁle approach is
also employed in models where alternatives have a more narrow interpretation, however.
Clearly, our analysis remains valid for these alternative interpretations as well.
We view this note as a ﬁrst step towards establishing a sound framework for welfarist
social evaluation on the basis of a single information proﬁle. Although we restrict attention
to the anonymity axiom, it would be useful to examine other properties of multi-proﬁle
social-evaluation functionals and to attempt to formulate their analogues in the single-
proﬁle setting.
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